Subprime Market Roller Coaster Disaster by Gibson, Willa E
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Publications The School of Law
September 2014
Subprime Market Roller Coaster Disaster
Willa E. Gibson
University of Akron School of Law, willa1@uakron.edu
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/ua_law_publications
Part of the Law Commons
This is brought to you for free and open access by The School of Law at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional
repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law
Publications by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact
mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation




THE SUBPRIME MARKET ROLLER COASTER  
 
The subprime lending market can be likened to a roller coaster descending with 
ominous velocity after an exhilarating ride.  The ascent of the subprime roller coaster ride 
was phenomenal, the rips and waves were exhilarating, and the top was breathless.  
However, its descent, which has no visible end, has changed both the faces of its riders 
from joy and exhilaration to weary and worry and has scarred the face of our economy.  
The riders include the usual cast of characters – commercial and investment bankers, 
non-bank lenders and investors – found at the center of most financial market losses 
threatening the stability of the economy and creating the real risk of systemic loss.  But 
this time, as the coaster descends, a group of unsuspecting riders – scores of debtors 
obligated on variable rate mortgages – also bear worrisome and weary facial expressions.   
And from afar, the faces of taxpayers who opted not to ride witness its descent with 
perplexed and disconcerted faces victimized by the cost of ride – the current recession.  
For years, state and federal government agencies responsible for regulating 
lending and securities practices watched the reckless, sometimes fraudulent behavior of 
mortgage brokers, mortgage lenders, securities firms, and investment banks in the 
subprime market.  They did nothing of substance to halt such practices almost as if they 
were complicit with the practices of lending and securities firms that fueled the market. 
They watched as subprime losses began changing the face of our economy.  Now 
financial markets are illiquid and key economic sectors – housing, job, and credit markets 
– essential to the country’s economic health are depressed.  
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Until recently, the Treasury Department (Treasury), the Federal Reserve (Fed), 
the Office of Comptroller and Currency (OCC), the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), along with state banking failed to utilize its regulatory authority in any significant 
manner to stymie the burgeoning losses.  Most likely, their apparent complicity stemmed 
from President Bush’s mandate that every American citizen should be able to enjoy 
homeownership.  A mistaken view that suggests home ownership is a right, not a 
privilege.  Obviously, federal government regulators did not foresee that the costs of their 
complicity would overshadow the esoteric and economic benefits citizens received from 
their ephemeral enjoyment of home ownership. While subprime debtors obtained the 
American dream, they did so at enormous cost to the economy, only to have to surrender 
that dream because of the economic consequences of the lending practices that enabled 
them to purchase homes in the first place.    
During the subprime market heyday, mortgage brokers forcefully solicited and 
lenders aggressively extended mortgages loans using lax lending standards to earn 
lucrative loan fees.   They made loans to applicants’ whose credit lenders traditionally 
used as a basis to deny them credit; and uncharacteristically, lenders even crossed the 
“redline” (historically, lenders drew an imaginary redline around poor inner city areas 
over which they would not cross to lend money.)  Hence, the loans were called 
“subprime.”   The demand for subprime mortgages was enormous.  Current estimates 
indicate that over 10 million subprime mortgages have made by lenders.    
Lenders made substandard loans because they knew they could shift the risk of 
loss associated with such loans by securitizing their subprime mortgage receivables.  
Lenders pooled their mortgage receivables into trusts, and Wall Street investment banks 
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securitized the mortgage pool by slicing them into specialized debt securities referred to 
as “collateralized mortgage obligations” (CMOs), whose yield was contingent on debtors 
paying the mortgage debt underlying the CMO.  Investment banks received millions of 
dollars in fees from lenders, and lenders were poised to collect from investment banks 
certain future cash flow payments from the pool of mortgage receivables securitized.    
More than a million CMOs were purchased by investors – primarily institutional 
investors.  Strong investor demand for CMOs fueled the subprime mortgage market.  The 
purchasers of CMOs primarily were institutional investors including pension and hedge 
funds, as well as foreign central banks pension. The lack of transparency in the CMO 
market prevented investors from knowing the true value of the debt securities they were 
purchasing; however, Triple-A ratings that most CMOs enjoyed prompted investors to 
purchase them. .  
At that time, their reliance appeared reasonable given the conservative reputation 
of the bond rating agencies.  Traditionally, the rating agencies’ culture had been one of 
aloofness toward their clients requesting that the agencies evaluate and rate their debt 
securities.  The conservative environment insured the integrity of their ratings and gave 
them a well-deserved reputation.  During the subprime market boom however, rating 
agencies became more accommodating to their clients in an effort to increase their 
market share.  Rather than being aloof, top management socialized with their clients as 
they rated most of their clients’ debtor securities Triple-A.  The impropriety of their 
relationships explains the inaccurate ratings and has prompted regulators to investigate 
the manner in which rating agencies evaluated CMOs.  
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The weak link in the subprime market was overvalued housing.  Once debtors 
were denied refinance requests, the house of cards started falling down and the 
foundation came crumbling after it.  Faced with debtor defaults, most CMO investors 
sought recourse against the real estate property collateralizing their CMOs.  While others 
recouped their losses from originating banks against which they had recourse for 
defaulted mortgage obligations.   In some cases, investors were forestalled from 
foreclosing on real estate because the securitization paperwork was so deficient that 
neither lenders nor investors could determine which homes actually securitized an 
investor’s CMO debt securities.  As debtor defaults revealed the true value of CMOs 
investor demand for CMOs decreased substantially.  Without investor demand, lenders 
had no secondary market to which they could shift their risk of loss prompting them to 
restrict subprime lending.  Now, its apparent that the strength of the housing market was 
just an illusion and that the value of the CMOs, which fueled the market, was based on 
that illusion.  
Historically, the securitization of receivables has provided lenders more flexibility 
in lending by allowing them to make loans to persons with less than prime credit profiles 
knowing that they could shift their risk of loss to securitization markets.  Well before the 
emergence of the securitization of consumer mortgage receivables, lenders were 
securitizing credit card, automobile and student loan receivables.   Consumers and 
businesses have benefited from such “securitization” because it provided them with more 
credit; thus facilitating their ability to spend and to invest money, both of which enhance 
the economy’s liquidity.  Increased lending activity also benefited lenders because it 
provided them opportunities to earn additional loan and credit card fees.  
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However, problematic to the CMO market with large receivable amounts, is its 
lack of transparency rendering it difficult to assess the true value of the debt securities 
traded in those markets.  For the most part, the quality of subprime loans went undetected 
for so long because the rating agencies inaccurately rated many CMOs as Triple-A debt 
securities.  Investors had access to documents from which they could have evaluated the 
collectability of the mortgage receivables; however, such evaluations would most likely 
have involved an inefficient allocation of their resources.  In lieu of reviewing numerous 
documents, investors relied heavily on the Triple-A ratings that bond rating agencies 
gave CMO debt securities.  Apparently, many of the investors incorrectly assumed that 
the rating agencies, which are subject to regulatory authority, would provide accurate 
ratings.   
Also problematic to the CMO market is the lack of lender accountability for the 
substandard loans they made.  Lack of accountability encouraged lenders to make 
substandard loans since they could use CMOs as risk-shifting devices.  To address the 
accountability problem market regulators could promulgate an implied warranty of 
collectability rule in which lenders warrant the collectability of their loans.  A breach of 
that warranty could render lenders monetarily liable in treble damages based on the 
defaulted mortgage obligation amount.   In addition, sanctions could be imposed on 
lenders whose lending practices were grossly negligent, reckless, or fraudulent.  Most 
likely, confronted with possible monetary damages and sanctions, lenders would tighten 
their lending standards.   
The most fundamental problem with securitizing mortgage receivables is that it 
encourages debtors and lenders to speculate on residential real estate, an essential 
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infrastructure of our country.  Quite naturally, the genesis and continued viability of the 
CMO securities market is based on investor speculation concerning the value of the real 
estate underlying CMOs and the creditability of debtors obligated on the securitized 
mortgage receivables.  In contrast, the traditional nature of debtor-creditor relationship 
has not been one of speculation.  Traditionally, creditors and debtors have had a vested 
interest in the homes securing mortgage obligations.  Securitization severs that traditional 
relationship by relieving lenders of concerns about whether a home’s value justifies the 
extension of credit requested by an applicant.  Consequently, subprime lenders routinely 
extended 100% or more substandard financing to debtors based on overinflated home 
values.  Accordingly, subprime debtors had no financial stakes in homes they were 
purchasing because they received 100% or more financing.  Without any vested financial 
interest, these debtors had no problem with obtaining loans they could not afford 
speculating that their homes would appreciate in value to allow them to refinance their 
mortgage obligations at affordable interest rates.  The origin and life blood of the CMO 
market was based speculation.  Without it, the market cannot survive.  We are witnessing 
its slow death because no one wants to speculate on home values anymore; and the 
numerous abandoned and foreclosed home throughout the streets of America are the 
product of that speculation.   
Driven mainly by greed, lenders, mortgage brokers, and debtors thought they 
could outwit the obligatory pricing components of home ownership, getting something 
without incurring any significant economic costs.  In reality, all they were doing was 
externalizing such costs to the cities and states throughout this nation that currently are 
struggling to maintain their identity as their landscapes are deteriorating.  The costs have 
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also been externalized onto our nation’s economy.  Many believe these costs should be 
internalized and the market forces should be allowed to squeeze out inefficient parties, 
even at the price of a recession. 
That decision will be left to the federal government.  So far it has decided to 
rescue market players, and appears poised to rescue subprime debtors.  Some view the 
bailouts as creating a moral hazard – providing a safety network that will merely 
encourage market players, lenders, and debtors to continue engaging in reckless behavior 
knowing they will not have to incur the costs of their behavior.  Apparently, the federal 
government has calculated the cost associated with moral hazards and has determined 
that the benefits the economy will accrue from such bailouts far exceed those costs.  
Arguably, the bailout requirement that obligates those bailed out to repay 
government funding addresses the moral hazard concern.  The current bailouts for 
investment banks and securities firms require them to repay the funding they receive 
from the Fed.  Plans for debtor bailouts are predicated on debtors repaying mortgage 
obligations, but only in amount equal to the value of their homes.  However, the 
counterargument is the uncertainty of repayment by parties who have exhibited such 
fiscal irresponsibility.  If investment banks or securities firms remain illiquid despite 
large cash infusions taxpayers will bear loss.   
Typically, defaults among subprime debtors are high because they often 
overextend themselves financially and they usually have poor credit histories.  What 
recourse will the government pursue against such debtors to satisfy the defaulted 
mortgage obligations, which was purchased with taxpayer money?  Ultimately, the 
government has two alternatives:  (1) repossess the homes; or (2) allow debtors to 
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maintain their homes for free.  The first option is incredible.  The Congress and the 
Administration would be hard-pressed to repossess homes on wide scale basis from its 
very own citizens.  The section option demoralizes fiscally responsible taxpayers who 
pay their obligations.         
During the heyday of the housing market, few would even discuss the possibility 
that the housing market would eventually go flat; or that scores of debtors’ would default 
as interest rates rose.  But both did happen because the government turned a blind eye to 
subprime lending practices for too long.  As usual, taxpayers will bear the loss as they 
become the victims of a recession that the government could have been averted.  
 
 
 
